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Abstract
Learning and adaptation is a fundamental prop-
erty of intelligent agents. In the context of adap-
tive information filtering, a filtering agent’s beliefs
about a user’s information needs have to be re-
vised regularly with reference to the user’s most
current information preferences. This learning
and adaptation process is essential for maintain-
ing the agent’s filtering performance. The AGM
belief revision paradigm provides a rigorous foun-
dation for modelling rational and minimal changes
to an agent’s beliefs. In particular, the maxi-
adjustment method, which follows the AGM ra-
tionale of belief change, offers a sound and ro-
bust computational mechanism to develop adap-
tive agents so that learning autonomy of these
agents can be enhanced. This paper describes how
the maxi-adjustment method is applied to develop
the learning components of adaptive information
filtering agents, and discusses possible difficulties
of applying such a framework to these agents.
Introduction
With the explosive growth of the Internet and the
World Wide Web (Web), it is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult for users to retrieve relevant information. This is
the so-called problem of information overload on the In-
ternet. Augmenting existing Internet search tools with
personalised information filtering agents is one possible
method to alleviate this problem. Adaptive information
filtering agents are computer systems situated on the
Web. They autonomously filter the incoming stream of
information on behalf of the users. Users’ information
needs will change over time, and information filtering
agents must be able to revise their beliefs about the
users’ information needs so that the accuracy of the fil-
tering process can be maintained. The AGM belief
revision paradigm (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makin-
son 1985) provides a rich and rigorous foundation for
modelling such revision processes. It enables an agent
to modify its beliefs in a rational and minimal way.
Maxi-adjustment (Williams 1996; Williams 1997a) is
a specific change strategy that follows the AGM’s ratio-
nale of belief revision. In particular, it transmutes the
underlying entrenchment ranking of beliefs in an abso-
lute minimal way under maximal information inertia.
In information retrieval models (Salton & McGill 1983;
Salton 1989), information objects are often assumed in-
dependent unless semantic relationships among them
can be derived. This intuition coincides with the un-
derlying assumption of the maxi-adjustment strategy.
The advantage of employing the maxi-adjustment strat-
egy as the agents’ learning mechanism is that seman-
tic relationships among information items can be taken
into account during the agents’ learning and adapta-
tion processes. Less users’ relevance feedback (Salton
& Buckley 1990) is required to train the filtering
agents, and hence a higher level of learning auton-
omy can be achieved when compared with the other
learning approaches employed in adaptive information
agents (Billsus & Pazzani 1999; Moukas & Maes 1998;
Balabanovic 1997; Pazzani, Muramatsu, & Billsus 1996;
Armstrong et al. 1995). This paper focuses on the ap-
plication of the maxi-adjustment method to the devel-
opment of learning mechanisms in adaptive information
filtering agents. Moreover, difficulties of applying such
a framework to the filtering agents are discussed.
The Adaptive Filtering Agent
Figure 1 is an overview of the major functional compo-
nents of an adaptive information filtering agent. The
focus of this paper is on the learning component of
the adaptive information filtering agent. The filtering
agent’s memory holds the current representation of a
user’s information needs. In particular, the notion of
belief state (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) is used to represent these
information needs. The learning component accepts
a user’s relevance feedback about filtered Web docu-
ments. Based on the proposed induction method, these
feedback is converted to the beliefs of a user’s infor-
mation needs. The maxi-adjustment strategy is then
applied to revise the beliefs stored in the agent’s mem-
ory with respect to these newly induced beliefs. As the
user’s information needs will change over time, such a
belief revision process needs to be conducted repeat-
edly. Technically, the learning behavior demonstrated
by the agent is a kind of reinforcement learning (Lang-
ley 1996). The matching component filters out relevant
information from a stream of incoming Web documents.
It is underpinned by logical deduction. In other words,
if the representation of a Web document is logically en-
tailed by the set of beliefs stored in the agent’s memory,
the Web document will be considered as relevant and
presented to the user. According to the user’s relevance
feedback, new beliefs may be added to, or existing be-
liefs may be contracted from the agent’s memory. The
adaptive information filtering agent is one of the main
elements in the agent-based information filtering sys-
tem (AIFS) (Lau, Hofstede, & Bruza 1999).
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Figure 1: An Overview of Adaptive Information Filter-
ing Agent
The AGM Belief Revision Paradigm
The AGM paradigm (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, &
Makinson 1985) provides a rigorous foundation for
modelling consistent and minimal changes to an agent’s
beliefs. In particular, belief revision is taken as tran-
sitions among belief states (Ga¨rdenfors 1988). A be-
lief state can be represented by a belief set K which is
a theory in a propositional language L (Ga¨rdenfors &
Makinson 1988). For the discussion in this paper, it is
assumed that L is the classical propositional language.
In the AGM framework (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, &
Makinson 1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988; Ga¨rdenfors 1992;
Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1988), three principle types of
belief state transitions are identified and modelled by
corresponding belief functions: expansion (K+α ), con-
traction (K−α ), and revision (K
∗
α). The process of be-
lief revision can be derived from the process of belief
contraction and vice versa through the so-called Levi
Identity i.e. K∗α = (K
−
¬α)
+
α , and the Harper Iden-
tity i.e. K−α = K ∩ K
∗
¬α. Essentially, the AGM
framework proposes sets of postulates to characterise
these functions such that they adhere to the ratio-
nales of consistent and minimal changes. In addi-
tion, it also describes the constructions of these func-
tions based on various mechanisms. One of them
is epistemic entrenchment (6) (Ga¨rdenfors & Makin-
son 1988). For instance, if α, β are beliefs in a be-
lief set K, α 6 β means that β is at least as en-
trenched as α. If inconsistency arises after applying
changes to a belief set, beliefs with the lowest degree
of epistemic entrenchment are given up. Technically,
epistemic entrenchment (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1988;
Ga¨rdenfors 1992) is a total preorder of the sentences
(e.g. α, β, γ) in L, and is characterised by the follow-
ing postulates: (EE1): If α 6 β and β 6 γ, then
α 6 γ; (EE2): If α ⊢ β, then α 6 β; (EE3): For
any α and β, α 6 α ∧ β or β 6 α ∧ β; (EE4): When
K 6= K⊥, α /∈ K iff α 6 β, for all β; (EE5): If β 6 α
for all β, then ⊢ α.
It has been proved that an unique contraction func-
tion can be defined by the underlying epistemic en-
trenchment through the (C-) condition (Ga¨rdenfors &
Makinson 1988):
(C-) K−α =
{
{β ∈ K : α < α ∨ β} if 6⊢ α
K otherwise
where < is the strict part of epistemic entrench-
ment defined above. Moreover, the (C-R) condi-
tion (Ga¨rdenfors 1992) also ensures that if an ordering
of beliefs satisfies (EE1)-(EE5), the contraction func-
tion, uniquely determined by (C-R), satisfies all but
the recovery postulates for contraction.
(C-R) K−α =
{
{β ∈ K : α < β} if 6⊢ α
K otherwise
Nevertheless, for a computer based implementation,
a finite representation of epistemic entrenchment or-
dering and a policy of iterated belief changes are re-
quired. Williams (Williams 1995; Williams 1997b) pro-
posed the finite partial entrenchment ranking (B) that
ranked the sentences of a theory in L with the mini-
mum possible degree of entrenchment (6B). Moreover,
maxi-adjustment (Williams 1996; Williams 1997a) was
proposed to transmute a finite partial ranking using
an absolute measure of minimal change under max-
imal information inertia. Belief revision is not just
taken as adding or deleting a sentence from a the-
ory but the transmutation of the underlying entrench-
ment ranking. Williams (Williams 1995; Williams 1996;
Williams 1997a) formally defined the following defini-
tions for a computational model of belief revision.
Definition 1 A finite partial entrenchment ranking is
a function B that maps a finite subset of sentences in L
into the interval [0,O] such that the following conditions
are satisfied for all α ∈ dom(B):
(PER1) {β ∈ dom(B) : B(α) < B(β)} 6⊢ α.
(PER2) If ⊢ ¬α then B(α) = 0.
(PER3) B(α) = O if and only if ⊢ α.
The set of all partial entrenchment rankings is de-
noted B. B(α) is referred as the degree of acceptance
of α. The explicit information content of B ∈ B is
{α ∈ dom(B) : B(α) > 0}, and is denoted exp(B).
Similarly, the implicit information content represented
by B ∈ B is Cn(exp(B)), and is denoted content(B).
Cn is the classical consequence operator. In order to
describe the epistemic entrenchment ordering (6B) gen-
erated from a finite partial entrenchment ranking B, it
is necessary to rank implicit sentences.
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Definition 2 Let α be a non tautological sentence. Let
B be a finite partial entrenchment ranking. The degree
of acceptance of α is defined as:
degree(B, α) =


largest j such that
{β ∈ exp(B) : B(β) ≥ j} ⊢ α
if α ∈ content(B)
0 otherwise
The maxi-adjustment strategy transmutes a partial
entrenchment ranking B based on the rationale of ab-
solute minimal change under maximal information in-
ertia. It is assumed that sentences in exp(B) (e.g. α, β)
are independent unless logical dependence exists be-
tween them. In particular, α is defined as a reason
of β if and only if degree(B, α→ β) > B(β).
Definition 3 Let B ∈ B be finite. The range of B
is enumerated in ascending order as j0, j1, j2, . . . , jO.
Let α be a contingent sentence, jm = degree(B, α) and
0 ≤ i < O. Then the (α, i) maxi-adjustment of B is
B⋆(α, i) defined by:
B⋆(α, i) =
{
(B−(α, i)) if i ≤ jm
(B−(¬α, 0))+(α, i) otherwise
where for all β ∈ dom(B), B−(α, i) is defined as fol-
lows:
1. For β with B(β) > jm, B
−(α, i)(β) = B(β).
2. For β with i < B(β) ≤ jm, assuming that
B−(α, i)(β) for β is defined with B(β) ≥ jm−k for
k = −1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1, then for β with B(β) = jm−n,
B−(α, i)(β) =


i if α ⊢ β or
α 6⊢ β and β ∈ Γ
where Γ is a minimal subset of
{γ : B(γ) = jm−n} such that
{γ : B−(α, i)(γ) > jm−n} ∪ Γ ⊢ α
B(β) otherwise
3. For β with B(β) ≤ i ,B−(α, i)(β) = B(β).
For all β ∈ dom(B) ∪ {α}, B+(α, i) is defined as
follows:
B+(α, i)(β) =


B(β) if B(β) > i
i if α ≡ β or
B(β) ≤ i < degree(B, α→ β)
degree(B, α→ β) otherwise
It has been stated that if i > 0 then content(B⋆(α, i))
is an AGM revision, and content(B⋆(α, 0)) satisfies
all but the recovery postulates for AGM contrac-
tion (Williams 1996).
Knowledge Representation
A Web page is characterised by a set of weighted key-
words based on traditional information retrieval (IR)
techniques (Salton & McGill 1983; Salton 1989). At
the symbolic level, each keyword k is mapped to the
ground term of the positive keyword predicate pkw i.e.
pkw(k). Basically, pkw(k) is a proposition since its in-
terpretation is either true or false. The intended in-
terpretation of these sentences is that they are satis-
fied in a document D i.e. D |= pkw(k) if D is taken
as a model (Chiaramella & Chevallet 1992; Lalmas
1998). For example, if d = { business, commerce, trade,
. . . } is the document representation at the keyword
level, the corresponding representation at the symbolic
level will be d = { pkw(business), pkw(commerce),
pkw(trade), . . . }. Similarly, a user’s information needs
are also represented as a set of weighted keywords
at the keyword level. However, this set of weighted
keywords is derived from a set of relevant documents
D+ and a set of non-relevant documents D− with
respect to the user’s information needs (Allan 1996;
Buckley, Salton, & Allan 1994). Based on the frequen-
cies of these keywords appearing in D+ and D−, it is
possible to induce a preference ordering among the key-
words with respect to the user’s information needs. The
basic idea is that a keyword appearing more frequently
in D+ is a more preferred keyword than another key-
word that appears less frequently inD+. Once this pref-
erence ordering is induced, it is taken as the epistemic
entrenchment ordering of the corresponding beliefs. It
is observed that the postulates of epistemic entrench-
ment is valid in the context of information retrieval in
general (Lau, Hofstede, & Bruza 1999). For example,
if {α, β, γ} is a set of information carriers (Bruza &
Huibers 1994), α 6 β and β 6 γ implies α 6 γ. In
other words, if an information searcher prefers informa-
tion carrier γ rather than information carrier β, and
information carrier β rather than information carrier
α, they prefer retrieving γ rather than α. This char-
acteristic of information carriers matches the epistemic
entrenchment postulate e.g. (EE1) of beliefs.
Moreover, it is necessary to classify a keyword as
positive, neutral, or negative (Kindo et al. 1997). In-
tuitively, positive keywords represent the information
items in which the users interested. Negative keywords
represent the information items that the users do not
want to retrieve. Neutral keywords mean that these
keywords are not useful for determining the users’ in-
terests. Eq.(1) is developed based on the keyword clas-
sifier (Kindo et al. 1997). It can be used to induce the
preference value pre(k) of a keyword k, and classify it
as positive, negative, or neutral.
pre(k) = ǫ× tanh
(
df(k)
ξ
)
×(
p(krel) tanh
p(krel)
prel
− (1− p(krel)) tanh
(1−p(krel))
(1−prel)
)
(1)
where ǫ is used to restrict the range of pre(k) such
that −1 < pre(k) < 1. The examples illustrated in this
paper assume that ǫ = 0.9. df(k) is the sum of the
number of relevant documents df(krel) and the number
of non-relevant documents df(knrel) that contains the
keyword k, and tanh is the hyperbolic tangent. The
rarity parameter ξ is used to control rare or new key-
words and is expressed as int(logN + 1), where N is
the total number of Web documents judged by a user,
and int is an integer function that truncates the decimal
values. p(krel) is the estimated probability that a docu-
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ment containing keyword k is relevant and is expressed
as the fraction df(krel)
df(krel)+df(knrel)
. prel is the estimated
probability that a document is relevant. In our system,
it is assumed that the probability that a Web document
presented by the filtering agent and judged as relevant
by a user is prel = 0.5. A positive value of pre(k) implies
that the associated keyword is positive, whereas a neg-
ative value of pre(k) indicates a negative keyword. If
pre(k) is below a threshold value λ, the associated key-
word is considered neutral. It is assumed that λ = 0.5
for the examples demonstrated in this paper. Basically
a positive keyword k is mapped to pkw(k), and a neg-
ative keyword k is mapped to ¬pkw(k). There is no
need to create the symbolic representations for neutral
keywords. For pkw(k) or ¬pkw(k), the entrenchment
rank B(αk) of the corresponding formula αk is defined
as:
B(αk) =
{
|pre(k)| if |pre(k)| ≥ λ
0 otherwise
(2)
The following is an example of computing the en-
trenchment rank B(αk) from a set of judged Web doc-
uments. It is assumed that there are a set of five doc-
uments having been judged as relevant (i.e. |D+| = 5)
and another set of five documents having been judged
as non-relevant by a user (i.e. |D−| = 5). Each doc-
ument is characterised by a set of keywords e.g. d1 =
{business, commerce, system}, d2 = {art, sculpture}.
Table 1 summarises the frequencies of these keywords
appearing in both D+ and D−, their preference values,
and the entrenchment ranks of corresponding formulae.
Table 1: Representation of users’ information preferences
Keywords D+ D− pre(k) Formula:αk Rank:B(αk)
business 5 0 0.856 pkw(business) 0.856
commerce 4 0 0.836 pkw(commerce) 0.836
system 2 2 0 - -
art 0 5 -0.856 ¬pkw(art) 0.856
sculpture 0 3 -0.785 ¬pkw(sculpture) 0.785
insurance 1 0 0.401 - -
Learning and Adaptation
Whenever a user provides relevance feedback for a
presented Web document, the belief revision process
can be invoked to learn the user’s current information
preferences. Conceptually, the filtering agent’s learn-
ing and adaptation mechanism is characterised by the
belief revision and contraction processes. For exam-
ple, if Γ = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is a set of formulae repre-
senting a Web document d ∈ D+, the belief revision
process (((K∗a1)
∗
a2
) . . .)∗an is invoked for each ai ∈ Γ,
where K is the belief set stored in the filtering agent’s
memory. On the other hand, the belief contraction
process (((K−a1)
−
a2
) . . .)−an is applied for each ai ∈ Γ
and d ∈ D−. The sequence of revising or contract-
ing the set of beliefs a1, a2, . . . , an is determined by
their entrenchment ranks and whether it is a revi-
sion or contraction operation. At the computational
level, belief revision is actually taken as the adjust-
ment of entrenchment ranking B in the theory base
exp(B). Particularly, maxi-adjustment (Williams 1996;
Williams 1998) is employed by the learning component
of the filtering agent to modify the ranking of its beliefs
in an absolute minimal way under maximal informa-
tion inertia. As the input to the maxi-adjustment al-
gorithm consists of a sentence α and its entrenchment
rank i, the procedure described in the Knowledge Rep-
resentation Section is used to induce the new rank for
each α ∈ Γ. Moreover, for our implementation of the
maxi-adjustment algorithm, the maximal ordinal O in
the interval [0,O] is chosen as 1.
One advantage of a symbolic representation of
the filtering agent’s domain knowledge is that
semantic relationships among keywords can be
captured. For example, if the keywords business
and commerce are taken as synonymous, this se-
mantic relationship can be modelled as a formula
pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce) in the filtering
agent’s memory. Moreover, classification knowledge
such as sculpture is a kind of art can also be used by
specifying the rule such as pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art).
It is believed that capturing the semantic rela-
tionships among keywords can improve the effec-
tiveness of the matching process (Hunter 1995;
Nie, Brisebois, & Lepage 1995). In fact, by employing
maxi-adjustment as the filtering agent’s learning mech-
anism, these semantic relationships can be reasoned
about during the reinforcement learning process. This
could lead to a higher level of learning autonomy since
changes to related keywords can automatically be
inferred by the filtering agent. As a result, less users’
relevance feedback may be required. The following
examples assume that the formulae pkw(business)
≡ pkw(commerce) and pkw(sculpture) → pkw(art)
have been manually added to the the agent’s memory
through a knowledge engineering process.
Example 1:
The first example shows how adding one belief to the
agent’s memory will automatically raise the entrench-
ment rank of another related belief. It is assumed that
the belief B(¬pkw(sculpture)) = 0.785 and the belief
B(pkw(business)) = 0.856 have been learnt by the fil-
tering agent. If several Web documents characterised
by the keyword art are also judged as non-relevant by
the user later on, the preference value of the keyword
art can be induced according to Eq.(1). Assuming that
pre(art) = −0.856, the corresponding entrenchment
rank can be computed as B(¬pkw(art)) = 0.856 ac-
cording to Eq.(2). By applying B⋆(¬pkw(art), 0.856)
to the theory base exp(B), the before and after im-
ages of the agent’s explicit beliefs (i.e. exp(B)) can be
tabulated in Table 2. Based on the maxi-adjustment al-
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gorithm, B+(α, i)(β) = i if B(β) ≤ i < degree(B, α→
β).
∵ B(¬pkw(sculpture)) ≤ 0.856 <
degree(B,¬pkw(art)→ ¬pkw(sculpture))
∴ B+(¬pkw(art), 0.856)(¬pkw(sculpture)) = 0.856
The implicit belief ¬pkw(art) → ¬pkw(sculpture)
in content(B) is derived from the explicit belief
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art) in the theory base exp(B),
and its degree of acceptance is 1 according to Defi-
nition 2. As the belief ¬pkw(art) implies the belief
¬pkw(sculpture) and the agent believes in ¬pkw(art),
the belief ¬pkw(sculpture) should be at least as en-
trenched as the belief ¬pkw(art) according to (PER1)
of Definition 1 or (EE2). In other words, whenever
the agent believes that the user is not interested in art
(i.e. ¬pkw(art)), it must be prepared to accept that the
user is also not interested in sculpture at least to the
degree of the former. The proposed learning and adap-
tation framework is more effective than other learning
approaches that can not take into account the semantic
relationships among information items. This example
demonstrates the automatic revision of the agent’s be-
liefs about related keywords given the relevance feed-
back for a particular keyword. Therefore, less users’
relevance feedback may be required during reinforce-
ment learning. Consequently, learning autonomy of the
filtering agent can be enhanced.
Table 2: Raising related beliefs
Formula:α B(α) Before B(α) After
pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce) 1.000 1.000
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art) 1.000 1.000
pkw(business) 0.856 0.856
¬pkw(sculpture) 0.785 0.856
¬pkw(art) 0 0.856
Example 2:
The second example illustrates the belief contrac-
tion process. In particular, how the contraction of one
belief will automatically remove another related belief
from the agent’s memory if there is a semantic rela-
tionship between the underlying keywords. Assuming
that moreWeb documents characterised by the keyword
sculpture are judged as relevant by the user at a later
stage, the belief B(pkw(sculpture)) = 0.785 could be
induced. As B⋆(α, i) = (B−(¬α, 0))+(α, i) if i > jm,
where i = 0.785 and jm = 0 in this example, B
⋆(
pkw(sculpture), 0.785) leads to the contraction of the
belief ¬pkw(sculpture) from the theory base exp(B).
Moreover, B−( ¬ pkw(sculpture), 0) (¬ pkw(art)) = 0
is computed because B( ¬ pkw( art)) = 0.856 = jm−n
and the set {γ :B−( ¬ pkw(sculpture), 0) (γ) > 0.856 }
∪ { ¬ pkw(art) } ⊢ ¬ pkw(sculpture) is obtained. The
before and after images of the filtering agent’s explicit
beliefs are tabulated in Table 3.
Example 3:
Table 3: Contracting related beliefs
Formula:α B(α) Before B(α) After
pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce) 1.000 1.000
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art) 1.000 1.000
pkw(business) 0.856 0.856
pkw(sculpture) 0 0.785
¬pkw(sculpture) 0.856 0
¬pkw(art) 0.856 0
This example demonstrates how multiple sentences
from the same Web document judged by a user can
be contracted from the agent’s memory. If some
Web documents characterised by sculpture and busi-
ness have recently been judged as non-relevant by
the user, both the belief B(pkw(sculpture)) = 0 and
the belief B(pkw(business)) = 0 could be induced.
Since beliefs with minimal entrenchment rank (i.e. 0)
are not supposed to be stored in the agent’s mem-
ory, maxi-adjustement for these two beliefs is still re-
quired so that they can be removed from the agent’s
memory. Basically, the contraction process B−(α, i)
is applied to both sentences. As opposed to the
belief expansion process where the most entrenched
sentence is applied to the agent’s memory first, the
least entrenched belief is first contracted from the
agent’s memory for belief contraction. Consequently,
B−(pkw(sculpture), 0) is invoked first. As there is
not other logically related sentences in the theory base
exp(B), the belief pkw(sculpture) is simply removed
from the agent’s memory. Similarly, the sentence
pkw(business) is also removed from exp(B) by apply-
ing B−(pkw(business), 0). The before and after images
of the filtering agent’s explicit beliefs are tabulated in
Table 4.
Table 4: Contracting multiple beliefs in one cycle
Formula:α B(α) Before B(α) After
pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce) 1.000 1.000
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art) 1.000 1.000
pkw(business) 0.856 0
pkw(sculpture) 0.785 0
Filtering Web Documents
In our current framework, the matching function of the
filtering agent is modelled as logical deduction. More-
over, a Web document is taken as the conjunction
of a set of formulae (Chiaramella & Chevallet 1992;
Hunter 1995). The following example illustrates the
agent’s deduction process with reference to previous ex-
amples. The resulting belief setsK = Cn(exp(B)) from
examples 1, 2, and 3 in the previous section are used
to determine the relevance of the following three Web
documents:
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φ = {pkw(business)∧ pkw(art)}
ϕ = {pkw(sculpture) ∧ pkw(art)}
ψ = {pkw(business) ∧ pkw(commerce)}
The filtering agent’s conclusions about the relevance
of the Web documents are summarised as follows:
Time: (t1)
K = Cn({pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce),
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art),
pkw(business),¬pkw(sculpture),¬pkw(art)})
∴ K 6⊢ φ, K 6⊢ ϕ, K ⊢ ψ
Time: (t2)
K = Cn({pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce),
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art),
pkw(business), pkw(sculpture)})
∴ K ⊢ φ, K ⊢ ϕ, K ⊢ ψ
Time: (t3)
K = Cn({pkw(business) ≡ pkw(commerce),
pkw(sculpture)→ pkw(art)})
∴ K 6⊢ φ, K 6⊢ ϕ, K 6⊢ ψ
As can be seen tentative conclusion drawn at time t1
may not hold when new information e.g. K−
pkw(business)
is processed by the agent at time t3. Strictly speak-
ing, the deduction process of the agent should be de-
scribed as K |∽ ψ, where |∽ is a nonmonotonic in-
ference relation because the inferred beliefs (i.e. con-
clusions) will not grow monotonically. It is not dif-
ficult to see that this |∽ should belong to the class
of nonmonotonic inference called expectation inference
(|∽6) (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1994). The basic idea
of expectation inference is that given a sentence α of
a propositional language L, if α and the subset of sen-
tences in a belief set K that is consistent with α (i.e.
{α} ∪ {β ∈ K : ¬α < β}) can classically entail another
sentence β, α |∽6 β can be deduced. With reference to
our examples, since K classically entails or not entails
φ, ϕ and ψ, and K ∪K = K, the definition of expec-
tation inference can trivially be applied to describe the
characteristics of the inference mechanism in the filter-
ing agent. Therefore, K |∽6 φ, where K is the filtering
agent’s belief set and φ is the logical representation of
a Web document, represents an inference conducted by
the adaptive filtering agent.
Discussion
An alternative approach for developing the filtering
agent’s learning mechanism is to apply the (C-) or the
(C-R) condition to revise the agent’s beliefs. It has
been stated that both the (C-) and the (C-R) condi-
tions can be used to construct the same class of belief
revision functions that satisfy the AGM postulates for
belief revision (Ga¨rdenfors 1992). The following ex-
ample illustrates how belief revision may be conducted
based on the (C-R) condition. Assuming that the fil-
tering agent’s initial belief set K is as follows:
K = {pkw(business), pkw(commerce),
pkw(sculpture), pkw(art)}
Moreover,
pkw(business) > pkw(commerce) >
pkw(sculpture) > pkw(art)
If a user perceives someWeb documents characterised
by the keyword business as non-relevant, the revision
process K∗
¬pkw(business) will be invoked. Based on the
Levi Identity, the sentence pkw(business) should first
be contracted from the belief set K. Consequently,
all the beliefs from K will be contracted according to
the (C-R) condition. The resulting belief set becomes
K
′
= {¬pkw(business)}. Nevertheless, a user who
does not require information objects about business
may still be interested in information objects about
art and sculpture. Therefore, applying (C-R) or (C-)
to construct belief contraction or belief revision func-
tion seems producing drastic changes in the context of
information retrieval and filtering. In fact, term in-
dependence is often assumed in information retrieval.
This intuition is reflected in the vector space model
of information retrieval (Salton & McGill 1983), where
changing the weight of a particular keyword may not
affect the others in the weight vector. Therefore, the
maxi-adjustment strategy produces a better approxi-
mation in terms of revising or contracting beliefs about
information objects with respect to a user’s information
needs.
Under the current framework, domain knowledge
such as semantic relationships among information ob-
jects is transferred to the filtering agent’s memory
through a knowledge engineering process. Since not
all semantic relationship is highly certain (i.e. assigning
the maximal entrenchment rank), by applying belief re-
vision to the agent’s memory, the corresponding beliefs
may be contracted from the memory over time. There-
fore, domain knowledge perhaps needs to be transferred
to the agent’s memory periodically in accordance with
the postulates of epistemic entrenchment. This can be
taken as an off-line process to minimise its impact on
the availability of the filtering agents. However, further
investigation is required to apply such a background
learning process to the filtering agents.
The belief setK = content(B) is actually used by the
agents to infer the relevance of Web documents. On the
other hand, maxi-adjustment is employed to revise the
theory base exp(B) and to maintain its consistency af-
ter applying changes. Though maxi-adjustment ensures
that the revised theory base is consistent, it is possible
that the belief set K becomes inconsistent (i.e. K ⊢ ⊥)
after applying changes such as B⋆(α, i). The following
is a classical example to explain such a problem. It is
assumed that the set of explicit beliefs exp(B) as well
as their entrenchment ranking is as follows:
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exp(B) = {∀x[penguin(x)→ bird(x)],
∀x[penguin(x)→ ¬fly(x)],
∀x[bird(x)→ fly(x)]}
B(∀x[penguin(x)→ bird(x)]) = 0.9,
B(∀x[penguin(x)→ ¬fly(x)]) = 0.7,
B(∀x[bird(x)→ fly(x)]) = 0.4
In the context of information retrieval and filtering,
penguin(x) → bird(x) can be interpreted as: if a user
is interested in information objects about penguin, it
is likely that the user is also interested in informa-
tion objects about bird. The other formulae in exp(B)
can be interpreted in similar way. Given the fact that
the user is interested in tweety which is a penguin i.e.
penguin(tweety) and B(penguin(tweety)) = 0.8, by
applying maxi-adjustment B⋆(penguin(tweety), 0.8),
the revised entrenchment ranking newB will be:
newB(∀x[penguin(x)→ bird(x)]) = 0.9,
newB(penguin(tweety)) = 0.8,
newB(∀x[penguin(x)→ ¬fly(x)]) = 0.7,
newB(∀x[bird(x)→ fly(x)]) = 0.4
The degree of acceptance of implicit beliefs is com-
puted based on definition 2:
degree(newB,¬fly(tweety)) = 0.7,
degree(newB, f ly(tweety)) = 0.4
As can be seen, even though exp(newB) 6⊢ ⊥, it
is clear that content(newB) ⊢ ⊥, where ⊢ is classical
derivability relation. If the filtering agent employs the
belief set K = content(newB) to deduce the relevance
of Web documents, any documents will be considered
as relevant. This problem must be addressed before the
filter agents can be put to practical use. One possible
solution is to make use of the degree of acceptance of
beliefs to produce the largest cut of content(B) so that
it does not entail ⊥. In other words, only the set of
consistent beliefs ∆ = {β ∈ K : ⊥ < β}, where < is the
strict part of epistemic entrenchment, will be used by
the filtering agent to infer the relevance of Web docu-
ments. Similar idea has been explored in developing the
expectation inference relation (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson
1994). For instance, α |∽6 γ iff γ ∈ Cn({α} ∪ {β ∈
∆ : ¬α < β}) is developed based on ∆ = {β : ⊥ < β}.
So, with reference to the above example, after applying
B⋆(penguin(tweety), 0.8), the agent should only make
use of the following set of beliefs for reasoning:
∆ = {∀x[penguin(x)→ bird(x)],
penguin(tweety),
bird(tweety),
∀x[penguin(x)→ ¬fly(x)],
¬fly(tweety)}
Therefore, the agent can conclude that the user
is interested in information objects about non-flying
tweety. The above reasoning process can also be ex-
plained based on nontrivial possibilistic deduction (|
∽P ) (Dubois, Lang, & Parade 1993; Dubois, Lang, &
Prade 1994). In possibilistic logic, the inconsistency
degree Incons(F ) of a possibilistic knowledge base F
is defined as the least certain formula involved in the
strongest contradiction of F . Moreover, nontrivial pos-
sibilistic deduction is defined as: F |∽P (α,m) iff F |=
(α,m) and m > Incons(F ). If the entrenchment rank
of a formula α is taken as the certainty m of a possi-
bilistic formula, Incons(K) = 0.4 with reference to the
above example. By employing possibilistic resolution,
K |= (fly(tweety), 0.4) and K |= (¬fly(tweety), 0.7)
can be obtained, where |= is possibilistic entailment.
Since the certainty degreem of ¬fly(tweety) equals 0.7
and is greater than Incons(K), K |∽P ¬fly(tweety).
Nevertheless, fly(tweety) can not be deduced from K
based on (|∽P ) because m = 0.4 6> Incons(K). How-
ever, further investigation is required to apply possi-
bilistic based inference to the matching components of
adaptive information filtering agents.
Conclusions
The AGM belief revision paradigm offers a powerful and
rigorous foundation to model the changes of an agent’s
beliefs. The maxi-adjustment strategy, which follows
the AGM rationale of consistent and minimal belief
changes, provides a robust and effective computational
mechanism for the development of the filtering agents’
learning components. As semantic relationships among
information items can be reasoned about via the maxi-
adjustment method, less human intervention may be
required during the agents’ reinforcement learning pro-
cesses. This opens the door to better learning autonomy
in adaptive information filtering agents. The technical
feasibility of applying the maxi-adjustment method to
adaptive information filtering agents has been exam-
ined. However, quantitative evaluation of the effective-
ness of these agents needs to be conducted to verify the
advantages of applying such a framework to construct
the learning mechanisms of these agents.
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